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The idea that the law of war should govern internal conflict may well
be an idea whose time has come. The serious student of this subject, the
oldest and until recently the most highly codified branch of international
law, soon discerns a familiar pattern in its development. Many of the
rules embodied in the present law of war first flowed from the pens of
scholarly advocates. Next, these rules were included in draft treaties
which never came into force and were then incorporated into formal
international agreements.' Once implanted in positive law, the germinal
ideas grew in scope and detail as nations supplanted the initial agree-
ments with successive conventions.' The notion, that parties to an inter-
nal conflict should respect the law of war has a similar lineage: long
advocated by scholars, included in draft instruments and finally incor-
porated in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.'
Though no one denies the importance of this "convention in minia-
ture," which, by its own language, applies to "armed conflicts not of
an international nature,"5 all recognize its inadequacies. At the urging
*Ass't. Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law; LL.B. Harvard; S.J.D. University
of Virginia.
'The scholar and diplomat Hugo Grotius has been recognized as the "father of international law"
because his treatise ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE so profoundly influenced its development.
Even today article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice advises members of the
Court to look to "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists ... as a subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law." The polemicist and humanitarian Henri Dunant stimulated
the whole codification movement in the last half of the 18th century with his A Memory of
Solferino. Cf G. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 2-3 (1958).
'The first attempt to regulate treatment of prisoners of war through an international convention,
for example, was made at Brussels in 1874. Articles 23 through 34 established a regime for their
capture, internment, and treatment. Cf. A. HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 273 (1909).
The Brussels Declaration, though never adopted as a convention, did establish principles that found
expression in later agreements such as the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions
of 1929 and 1949.
'A good illustration is the treatment of sick and wounded. The first Geneva Convention of 1864
dealt solely with the care of the sick and wounded in ten brief articles. Today there are two Geneva
Conventions for the protection of the sick and wounded, and they contain over 125 separate
articles.
'Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, [1955] 3 U.S.T.
3114, 3117, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32.
'Jean Pictet, the most distinguished authority on the Geneva Conventions, considers article 3
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of both the International Committee of the Red Cross6 and the United
Nations Secretariat,7 the world's governments have decided to draft new
and more detailed international rules for the regulation of internal con-
flict. In 1971, the first Conference of Government Experts on the Reaf-
firmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applic-
able in Armed Conflicts met in Geneva. [In May, 1972 the International
Committee of the Red Cross submitted a second protocol to extend the
protection of the Geneva Conventions to captured guerillas and other
combatants in civil wars.]
Before the next convention individual governments are reevaluating
their stands and preparing position papers for the arduous debates
ahead. One can easily identify the major substantive issues which will
divide the delegates. First, should the body of rules deduced from the
application of law of war principles to the problems of international
conflict also govern internal conflicts? Or, alternatively, do the problems
characteristic of internal conflict differ so markedly from those com-
mon to international conflicts that the application of the same principles
will nevertheless yield different rules? Second, should those rules already
proven inadequate in the context of international conflict be revised if
applied to internal conflicts? Beyond these macro-questions are the
many micro-questions of substantive law. The purpose of this article is
to set out and analyze the competing claims to apply or not to apply
the law of war to internal conflict.
I. THE CLAIM TO CONDUCT HOSTILITIES UNRESTRAINED BY THE
RULES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
As Professor Tom Farer has pointed out, "The international legal
rules governing combat operations . . . have traditionally been held to
apply only to international armed conflict."" Even article 3,9 the only
"one of their most important articles." I COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 38 (J. Pictet
ed. 1952). The four volume Commentary published under his general editorship is the standard
reference work on the Conventions.
'See generally INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, APPLICABILITY OF HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN CASE
OF INTERNAL DISTURBANCES (1955); INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, AID TO VICTIMS OF INTERNAL
DISTURBANCES (1962).
'25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. I, at 112, U.N. Doc. A/8001 (1970).
'Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of "International
Armed Conflict," 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 40 (1971).
'The text of Article 3 appears in the following conventions on the law of war: Geneva Convention
for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces in the Field), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, [19551 3
U.S.T. 3114, 3117, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32; Geneva Convention for the Protection
of War Victims (Armed Forces at Sea), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, 3220, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86; Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Prisoners
[Vol. 3: 345
1973] LAW FOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS
portion of the law of war universally recognized as applicable to internal
conflicts, I0 does not, it is often asserted, incorporate the Law of The
Hague. The assertion is not, it should be noted, that the language of
article 3 is so general as to be meaningless. However, that proposition
might be argued with equal or even greater justification.Il The belief that
article 3 does not incorporate any of the Hague rules is premised on the
view that its purpose differs from that underlying the Law of The
Hague." The only explicit provision in article 3 is its statement of
purpose. 3 The protection of noncombatants, which is widely under-
of War), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, [19551 3 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
136; Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Civilian Persons), Aug. 12, 1949, art.
3, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288.
"Article 19 of the Hague Convention of May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict does provide that those articles of the convention which relate to the
respect for cultural property apply to armed conflicts not of an international character. Hague
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in Time of War, May 14, 1954, art. 19, 249
U.N.T.S. 240, 256.
""it appears to us that the fundamental defect of art. 3 ... lies in the lack of balance between
the principle figuring or heading I and the enumeration as examples of particular violations under
subheadings a) to d)." Schlogel, Civil War, [1970] INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 123, 132-3.
'"The law of war is often broadly divided into two branches: The rules protecting noncombatants,
often called the law of Geneva; and the rules regulating conduct of hostilities, often called the law
of The Hague. The distinction is misleading for two reasons. The first is that documents signed at
either The Hague or Geneva often contain provisions with respect to both the protection of
noncombatants and the conduct of hostilities. Much of the early law on treatment of noncomba-
tants, for example, was embodied in the 1907 Hague Regulations of War. Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, effective Jan. 26, 1910, arts. 4-20, 36 Stat.
2277, 2296-301 (1911), T.S. No. 539. And the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, to take another example,
would fall within the law of The Hague. Geneva Protocol, Oct. 2, 1924, II INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 1398 (M. Hudson ed. 1931). Secondly, and more fundamentally,the distinction is
misleading to the extent that it implies that different purposes underly two categories. The purpose
of the law of The Hague is not only to regulate or govern the conduct of tactical operations but
rather to reduce human suffering and protect fundamental human rights by limiting operational
excesses. Thus, its purpose is the same as that of the law of Geneva.
'
3Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces in the Field) art. 3,
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, 3117, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32. Article 3 provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the terri-
tory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
multilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
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stood to be the basic purpose of the Law of Geneva, is not so readily
recognized as the animating spirit of the Hague rules. Scholars persist
in characterizing the latter as "game rules," as the following passage
illustrates:
The international law of war was primarily designed to govern a con-
test between two armed forces which carry on the hostilities in a more
or less open fashion. Analogously, the rules of football were designed
to govern a contest between two uniformed teams, clearly distinguisha-
ble from the spectators. How well would those rules work, however, if
one team were uniformed and on the field, the other hid itself among
the spectators, and the spectators wandered freely over the playing
field? 4
Analogizing the laws of war to football rules enables the author to make
his point effectively; unfortunately, he reinforces the misleading and
confusing idea that the purpose of the Hague rules is other than protec-
tion of noncombatants. It is not. 5 To the extent that the Hague rules
are intended to protect noncombatants, they are, as limited by reasona-
ble interpretation, incorporated into article 3.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Government
forces receive sniper fire from a small village. The village is suspected
of rebel sympathies, and reliable intelligence sources report that a rebel
unit has set up headquarters for its local operations in the village. The
commander of the government forces calls in artillery fire on the village.
A Red Cross medical unit is hit and several patients killed. Has the
commander violated article 3? Article 25 of the Hague Regulation pro-
vides that the "bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." Article 27
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict.
"Kelly, Legal Aspects of Military Operatons in Counter-insurgency, 21 MIL. L. REv. 95, 104
(1963).
"
5Neuman, The International Civil War, I WORLD POLITics 333, 363-64 (1949).
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says that in any attack, nonmilitary targets such as schools, hospitals,
churches, and museums should be spared. However, it should be noted
that damage to such institutions and loss of innocent lives does not
violate the laws of war so long as it is incident to a lawful attack upon
a legitimate military target. While the rebel soldiers are not protected
persons within the definition of article 3, the medical staff and patients,
as noncombatants, are entitled to "humane treatment."
If protection of noncombatants is the underlying purpose for restrict-
ing bombardment, then the answer becomes first one of interpretation,
and second one of fact. The interpretative question is one we shall
analyze again and again: what constitutes "humane treatment"? The
general requirement of humane treatment may be too slender a basis
upon which to incorporate all the rules whose purpose is the protection
of noncombatants, but we also find in article 3 the injunction that the
"wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for." Like all the provi-
sions in article 3, this, too, is very general. At a minimum, however, one
could surely imply that medical establishments cannot be attacked and
that hospital staff must be respected. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how
"the wounded and sick" can be "collected and cared for." One may then
conclude that the general requirements of humane treatment and care
for the sick and wounded preclude indiscriminate bombardment in the
circumstances outlined above. In short, this portion of the Hague rules
is incorporated into article 3.
The second question is the factual one: did the attack violate the rules
of bombardment? Was the artillery strike an excessive use of firepower?
Was the Red Cross unit clearly marked? Was it located dangerously
near a legitimate military target? It should not surprise lawyers that
here, as elsewhere in the law, "the facts" are more important than the
rule. One cannot determine whether the commander violated article 3
by shelling the village unless he knows "the facts." Rules are not unim-
portant, however, in analyzing specific claims to apply particular rules
in the conduct of tactical military operations.
A. The Claim to Use Terror Tactics
Both established governments and rebels have, in past internal con-
flicts, claimed the right to use terror tactics. Parties to conflict, of
course, piously condemn their opponent's resort to such "outrageous,
shocking" acts while cloaking their own conduct in euphemisms which
deceive only those who wish to be deceived. Whatever the label, terror-
ism is aptly defined as a "symbolic act designed to influence political
1973]
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behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of viol-
ence."' 
6
The guerrillas claim the right to use terror because in the early stages
of a conflict it is their only effective weapon. 7 Sabotage and political
assassination, we are told, are "characteristically guerrilla tasks. '"'8 The
record justifies the assertion. The revolutionary movement may begin
with the murder, beating, or kidnapping of selected government offi-
cials, employees, businessmen or landowners. 9 Between 1956 and 1960,
for example, the Viet Cong killed over 10,000 village officials in South
Vietnam.20 If the government attempts "to steal the rebel's thunder" by
extending medical and educational services to the previously neglected
peasants, the rebels undermine the programs by kidnapping the doctors
and teachers. In the earliest phases of the revolution the rebels use terror
to expose the government's weakness, intimidate its would-be support-
ers, and dramatize injustice and inequities.
In the next phase of the initial operations, the rebels raid villagg.,
attack small military posts, and ambush patrols. These actions have
many objectives including the need for food supply. In Greece the rebels
not only fed themselves with stolen foodstuffs but also embarrassed the
government by aggravating already existing food shortages.21 Guerrillas
also need weapons. One observer has calculated that the Castro forces
bought or received only 15 percent of their weapons from abroad.22 They
stole most of their weapons from army garrisons or captured them from
defeated troops. Most importantly, guerrillas need victories. Numeri-
cally inferior, they rely upon ruses and stratagems to inflict militarily
insignificant but politically embarrassing defeats upon government
forces.
In the last phase of their initial operations, the rebels strike at com-
munications facilities, power plants, and other similar installations. 23
The Algerian rebels announed their revolution with a series of nighttime
"Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, INTERNAL WAR 71, 73 (H. Eckstein ed.
1963).
"
7Falk, Six Legal Dimensions of the United States Involvement in the Vietnam War, II THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 216, 240 (R. Falk ed. 1968).
18T. FARER, THE LAWS OF WAR 25 YEARS AFTER NUREMBERG 42 (1971).
"Murray, The Anti-Bandit War, THE GUERILLA AND HOW To FIGHT HIM, 65, 68-9 (T. Greene
ed. 1962).
"Kelly, Assassination in War Time, 30 MIL. L. REV. 101 n.22 (1965).
"Murray, supra note 19, at 69.
"Chapelle, How Castro Won, THE GUERRILLA AND HOW To FIGHT HIM, 218, 229 (T. Greene
ed. 1962).
"aMurray, supra note 19, at 69.
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bombings. 4 Thus launched, the rebels continued to practice their terror-
istic art throughout the Algerian conflict.
The guerrillas nevertheless understand that they cannot terrorize the
entire population into supporting them and their cause. Mao insisted
upon "rigid discipline and scrupulously correct behavior by fully mobile
guerrilla troops in order to prevent their alienating the rural popula-
tion. .... "2s Halfway around the world and a decade later the other
revolutionary hero of our age, Che Guevara, decried the use of terrorism
because it is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since
it often makes victims of innocent people. He nevertheless conceded that
terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put
to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well-known for his
cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his
elimination useful."6 Guevara saw the guerrilla as an ascetic social re-
former who must always help the peasant.27
Consequently, the guerrillas claim only the right to use terror against
"the active participants in the struggle for power," and not against "the
more or less passive bulk of the citizenry."" Consider, for example, the
program of the Tupamaros, the urban guerrillas of Uruguay. They
robbed a bank to expose a financial scandal. They kidnapped an execu-
tive of the national power and telephone monopoly to reveal corrupt
rate-fixing.29 Each act had symbolic significance.
Government, in the few instances in which it is honest enough to
admit its use of terror, does not so delimit its claims. French theorists,
reflecting on their unhappy experience in Algeria, have concluded that
terror is the essential ingredient in guerrilla wars and thus advocate its
wide use. Colonel Trinquier bluntly declared:
We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the
14J. KRAFT, THE STRUGGLE FOR ALGERIA 69 (1961). The Algerian attacks have been described:
That night (November I, 1954) armed bands struck in fifty different actions all across
Algeria. Biskra was rocked by bomb explosions. In Batna the French army barracks
was attacked and two sentries killed. Two bombs exploded in downtown Algeria. Arris
was desieged. At Boutari the European-owned agricultural cooperative was destroyed.
In the Tighanimine Gorge armed bands stopped a bus, hauled out a caid and two
Europeans, and shot them on the spot. In the Kabylia two policemen were killed and a
storage depot was burned to the ground. Near Oran two settler farms were burned, a
motorist killed, a power plant attacked.
nJohnson, Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict, 14 WORLD POL. 646, 655 (1962).
11E. GUEVARA, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 17 (1961).
"Id. at 31.21T. FARER, supra note 18, at 42.
21N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1971, § I at 20, col. 5; cf. Delaney, Reflections on Political Communica-
tion and Insurgency, 22 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 3 (Dec. 1969).
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unconditional support of a population. According to Mao Tse-tung, it
is an essential to the combatant as water to the fish. Such support may
be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably a temporary
condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by every possible
means, the most effective of which is terrorism.3
Professor Farer, who feels sympathetically toward guerrilla terrorism
but quivers with moral indignation at the government variety, captures
in a single sentence the unfortunate consequences of a government pol-
icy of indiscriminate terrorism: "It beaches the guerrilla fish by draining
the sea.' Such broadscale use of terror seems almost genocidal, par-
ticularly when employed against ethnic groups such as the Kurds in Iraq
or the Ibos in Nigeria.
Occasionally, governments claim rather more limited rights to resort
to terror. In the later stages of a guerrilla war when rebels have suc-
ceeded in occupying and administering territory, the government itself
may adopt a program of political assassination. A journalist described
how such a program operated in Vietnam:
South Vietnamese government squads, generally operating in stealth
at night, have begun a campaign of terror against Viet Cong officials
in the Mekong River Delta.
Small teams of commandos, armed with exact intelligence and dag-
gers, are moving into Viet Cong hamlets in critical provinces near
Saigon, assassinating key Viet Cong leaders, and slipping away.
They are leaving calling cards on the bodies of their victims-an
enormous white eye printed on a black slip of paper.3 2
The Applicable Law
Does present international law permit or in any way circumscribe the
use of such terror tactics in internal conflicts? Article 3 only protects
those persons taking no active part in the hostilities. It does not protect
combatants. But who in the context of an internal guerrilla conflict is a
combatant? The traditional idea that he must be in military uniform
may be inadequate. Professor Farer has, for example, asked:
Why should the guerrilla be castigated for failing to distinguish be-
tween the commander of a district para-military force and the civilian
official from whom he receives orders? Why should the Minister of the
Interior ensconced in his office be legally immune, while some
'"R. TRINQUIER, MODERN WARFARE 8 (1961).
'IT. FARER, supra note 18, at 29.
32N.Y. Times, July 15, 1964, at 3, col. 3.
[Vol. 3: 345
LAW FOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS
wretched platoon suffocating in the scorched bush is fair game? And
why distinguish between the general, directing hostilities from a com-
mand helicopter, and the same man clipping roses in the garden of his
villa?3
Practice in World War II and after has already eroded the earlier
customary rules which forbade political assassination in international
conflict, 34 and some see little reason to prohibit it in internal conflicts.
Professor Farer's examples suggest that all those officials with policy
making powers can be considered legitimate assassination targets. At
the same time, one need not limit assassination targets to those receiving
government pay checks. The editor of a pro-government or pro-guerrilla
newspaper, an influential private businessman, a prominent clergyman
responsible for organizing rebel forces-all would seem to be legitimate
targets under a broader test of combatancy.
Whether it is desirable to legitimize assassination, however, is debata-
ble.35 While uniformed soldiers do not fight along fixed battle lines in
a guerrilla war, they do still engage each other in fire fights-the para-
digm circumstance in which the law permits one combatant to take the
life of another. Assassination permits a combatant to kill another when
that other poses no immediate threat to the slayer's life. Why an internal
struggle for power should transform what is otherwise murder into a
legitimate act of war, absent the conditions which normally justify kill-
ing in war, is not clear. Selective use of assassination does not make it
any less reprehensible, and one may speculate that the guerrilla's infre-
quent use of the tactic reflects, if not their deference to the norms
forbidding it, at least their recognition that reciprocal assassination by
the government would escalate the conflict to undesirable levels of bru-
tality. While assassination may be an effective guerrilla weapon, effec-
tiveness has never been the sole test of legality. The tactic seems particu-
larly indefensible when used to disrupt the political process which might
otherwise produce some compromise settlement of the problems which
bred the internal conflict.
Terror tactics are not limited to political assassination or kidnapping,
however. Many terroristic acts inevitably injure those who even under
some broader test of combatancy are noncombatants protected by arti-
cle 3. The question is whether it protects them from terroristic acts. The
answer must depend on whether the military benefit gained outweighs
"T. FARER, supra note 18, at 43.
'Kelly, supra note 20 at 101.
1id.
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the harm inflicted upon innocent people. Che Guevara used an instruc-
tive illustration in his primer on guerrilla warfare:
If well conducted, sabotage is an effective weapon. But do not knock
out industries and put people needlessly out of work without helping
to achieve the revolution's goals. For example, stopping a soft-drink
factory will not paralyze a whole sector of the oppressor's economy;
blowing up an electric plant will."
The example not only reflects the balancing of interest suggested earlier,
it also suggests that an appropriate balance can be struck by distinguish-
ing, as the law of war has always done, between military and nonmili-
tary targets. Whether one can rely on a generalized rule rather than on
a specific enumeration of permissible military targets or, alternatively,
a listing of those targets which should be immune from attacks, is
debatable; but however formulated, such a stricture should eliminate the
bomb-in-the-marketplace kind of terrorism. In attacking legitimate tar-
gets, the guerrillas should minimize the destructive impact upon the
innocent population. For example, they can strike a plant after hours
when the work force is absent, or they can use small explosives which
destroy the target without damaging surrounding buildings or homes.
There remain, of course, a wide range of legitimate activities often
denominated terroristic. Ambushing a military convoy, blowing up a
barracks, and robbing an arms depot are to war as dribbling, passing
and shooting are to basketball. These are legitimate military targets.
The legitimacy of certain other kinds of terror tactics, particularly
bombing, is analyzed below.
B. To Use Chemical or Biological Weapons
During the Yemeni civil war, royalist forces charged that the Egyp-
tians gassed their troops and napalmed loyal villages." The Egyptians
denied the charge,38 and the facts remain disputed.39 Certainly neither
side publicly claimed the right to use gas or any other chemical or
biological weapons. The United States has, however, insisted that it has
the right to use tear gases and herbicides and has acted upon that
conviction in the Indo-China war.10 Though participants have seldom
3
"E. GUEVARA, supra note 26, at 18.
3 Meselson, The Yemen, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 99 (S. Rose ed. 1968).
"uld.
3
1 STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGI-
CAL WARFARE 225-38 (1971).
"Statement by President Nixon, Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs, 61
DEP'T. STATE BULL. 541 (1969).
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invoked the right in past internal conflicts, they may, acting on the
Vietnamese precedent, claim it in the future. Chemical and biological
agents range from the lethal to the nontoxic, and their legality is much
debated.4
The Applicable Law
Article 3 does not explicitly limit the use of any weapon-con-
ventional, chemical, or biological. It does, however, in addition to
imposing the general requirement of humane treatment, forbid cruel
treatment. One could plausibly equate "cruel treatment" with the
infliction of "unnecessary suffering," the standard found in article
22 of the Hague rules4" and the basis for outlawing almost all illegal
weapons of war. But since article 3 only protects noncombatants
i.e., "persons taking no active part in the hostilities," it would not
prohibit the commander from using chemical or biological weapons
against combatants. This result obtains not because the use of such
weapons does not constitute cruel treatment, but because combatants
fall outside the protective ambit of the article. Article 3 simply does not
require that government forces treat resisting rebels humanely.
However, chemical and biological weapons do affect the noncomba-
tant population; therefore, their use may violate the article 3 charge to
treat noncombatants humanely. The World Health Organization con-
cluded that "[c]hemical and biological weapons pose a special threat to
civilians" because their effects were "indiscriminate" and could lead to
"significant unintended involvement of the civilian population within
the target area and for considerable distances downwind." The report
emphasized the "uncertainty and unpredictability" of such weapons
because of "complex and extremely variable meteorological, physiologi-
cal, epidemiological, ecological and other factors."" If the effect of
these weapons is uncontrollable, thereby endangering the noncombatant
population, article 3 may prohibit their use-at least where the military
4 See generally Baxter & Burgenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 A.J.I.L.
853 (1970). The twelve member Geneva Disarmament Conference has recently agreed on a draft
text prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons. The draft text may be found 65 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 508-10 (Nov. I, 1971).
2It is almost impossible to determine what constitutes "unnecessary suffering," and some have
therefore argued that it imposes no effective restraints on the use of new weapons. Cf. J. STONE,
LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 550-51 (1959).
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unit has available for its use some less blind weapon with which it can
eliminate or neutralize the enemy target.
The international law standard is clearer. The Geneva Protocol of
192511 forbids "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices," as well as "the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare." Every major state except the
United States and Japan has ratified the Protocol. The President of the
United States has submitted the Protocol to the Senate for its advice
and consent and has publicly declared that the United States will respect
the principles embodied therein. 6 As Professor Baxter has pointed out.
The weight of opinion appears today to favor the view that customary
international law prescribes the use of lethal chemical and biological
weapons. 7
Does customary or conventional law likewise proscribe the use of
nonlethal chemical and biological weapons? Though disputed, the con-
sensus is that it does. Many scientists reject the military distinction
between lethal and nonlethal agents, arguing that the effects of a chemi-
cal warfare agent depend as much on the way it is used as on its toxicol-
ogical properties. 8 A lethal agent if disseminated in small doses may
cause only temporary incapacity. A nonlethal agent may kill or severely
injure one exposed to an unexpectedly large concentration. Further-
more, some scholars argue that tear gas, for example, is usually used
in conjunction with other, lethal weapons whose effectiveness it en-
hances." They add that the use of any kind of gas is repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.
There is also a growing body of authoritative pronouncements which
bar the use of all chemical and biological weapons. The International
Committee of the Red Cross has long contended that the ban was
absolute. 0 The General Assembly also declared the use of chemical and
biological agents "contrary to the general recognized rules of interna-
"III INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1670-72 (M. Hudson ed. 1931).
"Statement by President Nixon, supra note 40.
"Baxter & Burgenthal, supra note 41, at 853.
4"WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 43, at 12.
"Compare Meselson, Behind the Nixon Policy for Chemical and Biological Warfare, 26 BULL.
OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 23, 31 (Jan. 1970) with New York Times, Sept. 29, 1969, at It, col. 1.
Much of the distaste for the use of tear gas in Vietnam stems from the critics' conviction that it is
used to "flush out" suspected Viet Cong who are then machine gunned.
5
°International Conferences of the Red Cross have repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning
the use of indiscriminate weapons, as the chart below indicates:
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tional law" 2 and the same sentiment is expressed in the new treaty on
biological warfare.
C. To Employ Strategic Bombing"
The incumbent government often enjoys an advantage in firepower.
At various times the Iraqi, Cuban, Nigerian, and Pakistani governments
have all struck against rebel factions from the air. Monopolizing the
skies, they strafed and bombed villages and rural areas suspected of
rebel sympathies. During the Vietnam war, the United States dropped
more bombs on Southeast Asia than it dropped on Germany and Japan
during World War I L" Critics have questioned the wisdom of air strikes
in internal conflicts,?5 and the record proves that predominant air power
Conference Place Date Resolutions
Xth Geneva 1921 XII
Xllth Geneva 1925 V
XlIIth The Hague 1928 V & VI
XIVth Brussels 1930 V
XVth Tokyo 1934 XXXVI
XVIlth Stockholm 1948 XXIV
XVIllIth Toronto 1952 Xvii & XVIIi
XIXth New Delhi 1957 Xvill
XXth Vienna 1965 XXVIII
XXIth Istanbul 1969 XIV
"See 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. I, at 112, U.N Doc. A/8001 (1970).
2G.A. Res. 6203, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1970). The resolution
was adopted by a vote of 80-3 with 36 abstentions. The abstaining countries included the United
States and most of her NATO allies who are also parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
"Other claims are made to use firepower in particular ways, as in "free fire" zones. The concept
of free fire zones is identified almost exclusively with American practices in Vietnam, however,
and is not therefore universal enough to justify textual analysis. The term connotes a policy of
authorizing troops to fire at anything and everything; and while that has never been the policy of
the United States, it has been her soldiers' occasional practice-as it has occasionally been the
practice of soldiers in all conflicts-to shoot first and ask questions later. During the Vietnam War,
allied forces designated specified strike zones within which troops enjoyed greater than usual
freedom to fire. These specified strike zones were established in hostile areas which the government
wanted to pacify. First, the South Vietnamese government and army would evacuate all innocent
civilians. Second, they would certify that no one other than Viet Cong inhabited the area. Then
allied forces operated under relaxed rules of engagement, which, while classified, can at least be
said to have given the individual soldier and unit considerable discretion in firing.
"Cf T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 140-45 (1970).
"Professor Falk has challenged the legality of the bombing as well. Falk, International Law and
the United States Role in the Viet Nam War 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966). But see Moore,
International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War: A Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051
(1967).
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does not insure victory;5" but few states with an air capability have
foregone using it.
The Applicable Law
Just as article 3 does not explicitly forbid the use of chemical and
biological weapons, it does not forbid the use of air power unless its
impact is so indiscriminate as to endanger protected persons. Given the
precision with which bombing raids can be conducted, it is difficult to
see how the article 3 injunction to treat noncombatants humanely can
be construed as an absolute ban against bombing. It may nevertheless
make illegal particular raids which inflict great injury upon the civilian
population without achieving commensurate military gains.
In internal conflicts examples of such indiscriminate bombing are
numerous. Since Iraqi pilots were unfamiliar with the Soviet planes they
flew, they area bombed; and while the government pounded Kurdish
areas mercilessly, the available evidence indicates that the bombing
failed to inflict heavy losses on the guerrillas." The Batista air force
bombed rural areas indiscriminately. Critics allege the same is true of
the American bombing policy in South Vietnam." One report asserts
that 80 percent of bombing victims in Vietnam have been civilians."
Another likens the Vietnamese countryside to a moonscape desolate and
pocked with craters. 0
It is difficult to conclude, however, that bombing raids which inflict
heavy losses on the civilian population are illegal under article 3, since
they are arguably permissible under the relevant norms of international
law applicable to international conflicts. In the first place, there are no
codified rules of aerial warfare." The rules governing land bombard-
ment provide some guidance when applied analogously, but they are
inadequate, as they were drafted in 1907 before the air age began. In
the second place, state practice has imposed few limits on bombing. The
Germans launched indiscriminate V-2 rocket attacks against England.
56Batista lost in Cuba. Iraq settled for a draw in its fight against the Kurds. Cf New York Times,
Mar. 19, 1970.
"Vreeland, Iraq, II CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 381, 399 (1967).
'IT. TAYLOR, supra note 54.
"Washington Post, July II, 1971, at 1, col. I.
"Wulff, A Doctor Reports from South Vietnam, CRIMES OF WAR 309, 310. (R. Falk, G. Kolko,
& R. Lifton, ed. 1971).
"The Draft Rules of Aerial Bombardment promulgated in 1923 were never adopted. See
generally DeSaussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There Any? 23 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV.
35 (Feb. 1971).
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The Americans firebombed Dresden and Tokyo and dropped atomic
bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The lack of authoritative rules
coupled with the record of state practice has led some scholars to con-
clude that international law imposes no restraints on bombing."
In the Shimoda case the Japanese District Court rejected this argu-
ment and held that blind aerial bombardment was still illegal though it
did not go so far as to label strategic area bombing illegal.13 Scholars
remain divided on this point64 and are likely to remain so until the
international community adopts a formal code regulating the use of air
power in armed conflict.
D. To Commit Reprisals
In the Arab-Israeli conflict both sides have justified individual raids
or air strikes as reprisals. 5 Public officials in the United States have
occasionally characterized particular Allied operations in Vietnam as
reprisals. 6 As internal conflicts degenerate into bloody wars, each side
will likely seize upon some real or imagined excess by its opponent to
justify its own excesses. Reprisal, an illegitimate act of warfare used in
retaliation against a prior illegal act by the enemy for the purpose of
forcing him to comply with the laws of war,67 is always the legal ration-
ale. Although participants in internal conflicts remain free to use repris-
als, their discretion is not unlimited.
The Applicable Law
Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention prohibits reprisals against
cultural or artistic property in any armed conflict. Furthermore, article
3 explicitly forbids "the taking of hostages," a frequent reprisal tactic
in an earlier era. The question is whether the general protection afforded
by article 3 to the noncombatant population insulates them from any
other kind of reprisal. Pictet argues that the humane treatment require-
ment excludes reprisals against protected persons as individuals or as
"British Air Marshall Harris said: "In the matter of the use of aircraft in war, there is, it so
happens, no international law at all." A. HARRIS, BOMBER OFFENSIVE 177 (1947). Cf. O'Brien,
The Meaning of Military Necessity in International Law, I Y.B. WORLD POLITY 109 (1957).
3Judgment of Dec. 7, 1963 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.), 8 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 212, 240 (1964).
"Compare J. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 265-81 (3rd ed. 1947) with M.
McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 665-66 (1961).
"See Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 A.J.I.L. 415 (1969).
See generally Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard, 64 A.J.I.L. 73 (1970).
"Cf New York Times, July 6, 1971, at 1, col. 2. Quincy Wright questioned the validity of the
Tonkin Gulf reprisals in Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet Nam Situation, 60 A.JI.L. 750 (1966).
I'M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 407-8 (1959).
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members of a community." Mr. Kalshoven thinks the answer is less
certain and therefore urges amending article 3 to prohibit all forms of
reprisals. 9 If article 3 prohibits all reprisals, as Pictet contends, it goes
further than do the present rules of international law applicable to
international conflicts. While they enumerate many specific prohibi-
tions, they do permit reprisals against innocent persons outside the
control of the reprising power. There is no control criterion included in
article 3; but it would be anomalous if a single provision, thought to
embody the minimum protections of the larger agreement, in fact ex-
tended greater protections than the parent instrument.
The unmistakable trend in international law is toward limiting the
right of reprisal.70 Although the Belgian delegate to the 1874 Brussels
Conference felt there was something "odious" about the principle of
reprisal,7 the reporter of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference commented
that the provision in article 50 prohibiting collective punishment had
been drafted "without prejudice to the question of reprisal."7 Not until
the 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention did international law
include an express prohibition of reprisals against prisoners.73 The 1949
Geneva Conventions expanded that prohibition. Now all persons and
property protected by the four Conventions are also protected from
reprisals.74
International law also prohibits the use of particular weapons as
reprisals. Many states which ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol reserved
the right to use the prohibited weapons if another party first used them.
81 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 55 (J. Pictet ed. 1952); 1I COMMENTARY ON
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 36 (J. Pictet ed. 1960); lII COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS 40 (J. Pictet ed. 1960); IV COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 39 (J.
Pictet ed. 1958).
"Kalshoven, Human Rights, The Law of Armed Conflict, and Reprisals, 11 INT'L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS 183 (1971).
7 But see Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, 22 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV.
56, 58-60 (Feb. 1970).
7 Quoted in Kalshoven, supra note 69, at 185.
721d. at 184.
"Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, effective Aug. 4, 1932, 47 Stat.
2021, 2031 (1933), T.S. No. 846, 118 L.W.T.S. 343, 357.
74See Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces in the Field), Aug.
12, 1949, art. 50, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, 3146, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 63; Geneva
Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces at Sea), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51,
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 117; Geneva Convention for the
Protection of War Victims (Prisoners of War), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 130, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, 3420,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 238; Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims
(Civilian Persons), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, 3618, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 388.
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It is difficult to imagine states agreeing to anything more than a no-first-
use prohibition on such weapons. One must keep in mind, however, that
such reservations do not entitle a state to use such weapons in retaliation
for any infringement of the laws of war other than use of the proscribed
weapon.75
II. THE CLAIM TO INTERFERE WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
More than a century ago Abraham Lincoln asked whether a govern-
ment of necessity must be too strong for the liberties of its people or
too weak to maintain its own existence. It was Mr. Lincoln who estab-
lished the first modern precedent for suspending democratic guarantees
during a civil war, and today free societies usually confer nearly dicta-
torial powers on their war leaders, confident that their Cincinnatus will
vanquish the enemy, restore the sacrificed freedoms, and return to his
plow. Emergency government is a normal response to either external or
internal crises; and whatever its precise form, emergency government
claims the right to intensify its regulation and supervision of the com-
munity. Whether such claims are legally permissible within the domestic
constitutional framework of any given country is beyond the purview of
this article.7" What is relevant is the compatibility of such claims with
the applicable rules of international law.
A. To Relocate Citizens
Quite frequently, governments combating an internal guerrilla move-
ment assert the right to relocate citizens in "fortified," "strategic," or
"pacified" villages or hamlets. In Malaya the British uprooted hundreds
of thousands of Chinese squatters living in remote jungle villages which
the army and police could not protect and resettled them on new land
within effective British control." They deeded land to these peasants,
who henceforth lived in one of 600 new villages enclosed in barbed wire
and lighted at night.7 The British thus severed the lifeline between the
guerrillas and the civilian community while improving the living condi-
tions of the poorest and most vulnerable portion of the population.79
One observer analogized the British effort to pest control: "to destroy
75Kalshoven, supra note 69, at 188.
7 See generally C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 77-129 (1948).
"Linebarger, They Call 'em Bandits in Malaya, MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE 293, 296-7 (F.
Osanka ed. 1962).
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the enemy, [they are] breaking up the nesting places of the pests."' "
In Cambodia the government resettled approximately 600,000
Khmers in rectangular, stockaded villages which the native population
could defend. As in Malaya, the motive was the same: to snatch "a
malleable and easily terrorized population from the enemy grasp." The
result, again, was an improvement in the economic life of the relocated
peasant."'
In Algeria, the French emulated the British practice, by moving
nearly two million Moslems into fortified villages. One of the principal
theoretical architects of French strategy commented upon its historical
roots: "In effect, we are reestablishing the old system of medieval forti-
fied villages, designed to protect the inhabitants from marauding
bands.""2 Undoubtedly, some villages came voluntarily to escape the
rebels. Others were forced to protect themselves.13 The army, which
operated this system of quadvillages, imagined itself building a new
Algeria.84
To salvage the old Algeria, however, the French intensified their
supervision of the "pacified" population. In Algiers, for example, they
issued identification cards and consistently checked Moslems. They also
established the ilot system: one person in each family was responsible
to a floor chief who was responsible to a building chief who was respon-
sible to a block chief. Through this system the French administrator
could and did reach into every Moslem home. A French military maga-
zine described the mission: "The population must be cleaned up, as-
sisted, helped, organized, administered."85
The Portuguese in their African provinces, the Ethiopians, the Israelis
in the occupied territories, the South Vietnamese and Americans in
Vietnam have all used the same or similar techniques. While these
relocation programs differ in scope and detail, they remain identical in
the broad outlines. All of the civilians within a particular territory are
removed from their homes and resettled in areas which the government
can defend. The government extends medical, educational, and other
social services to the villages while closely watching the native popula-
tion. The educational program usually includes political indoctrination.
"'Linebarger, supra note 77 at 296.
"Kelly, Revolutionary War and Psychological Action, MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE 425,438
(F. Osanka ed. 1962).
"
2R. TRINQUIER, supra note 30 at 74.
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The Applicable Law
Article 3 does not prohibit resettlement programs. Since all those
involved would fall within the protective ambit of article 3, they are, of
course, entitled to "be treated humanely, without any adverse distinc-
tion founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth."
Though some might argue that resettlement programs for specific
groups such as the Moslems in Algeria, the Chinese in Malaya, or the
blacks in Angola and Mozambique represent impermissible discrimina-
tions based on religion, color, and race, the government can reply that
article 3 prohibits only adverse distinctions on those grounds. From the
government's point of view, the resettlement program is in the best
interests of the people relocated. Furthermore, the government could
contend that so long as its motives were other than bias or prejudice
against particular ethnic groups, it cannot be barred from taking legiti-
mate steps to secure itself and its citizens simply because the burdens
of defense fall more heavily on one group than another.
More specific guidelines for the operation of resettlement programs
may be found in the international law applicable to international con-
flicts, particularly the law of belligerent occupation. Article 49 of the
Geneva Civilian Convention is the key article. s6 While prohibiting
"[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers," it does authorize the "total or
"Article 49 of the Geneva Civilian Convention states:
Individual or mass forcible transfers; as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other
country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motives.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a
given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.
Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the
bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to
avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their
homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure; to the
greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the pro-
tected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene,
health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated.
The protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as
they have taken place.
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly
exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military
reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies.
Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Civilian Persons), Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T.
3516, 3548, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 318.
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partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand." The article admonishes the
occupying power to transfer "[p]ersons thus evacuated . . . back to
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area . . . " cease, as the Viet-
namese have done once Allied forces have pacified the area. During the
evacuation and relocation, members of a family may not be separated.
The government must also insure "satisfactory conditions of hygiene,
health, safety, and nutrition.""7 Most governments try to comply but
few succeed. While some provisions of article 49 would make little sense
in the context of an internal conflict in which both sides consider them-
selves citizens of the same country (secessionist wars excepted), article
49 sets out some standards which could be used to implement the article
3 requirement of humane treatment.
Other Civilian Convention articles raise disquieting questions about
other aspects of relocation programs. Article 51 prohibits the occupying
power from "compelling protected persons to serve in its armed or
auxiliary forces." Furthermore, it forbids "pressure or propaganda
which aims at securing voluntary enlistment." The Vietnamese "Chieu
Hoi" program is a typical example of government efforts to reeducate
disaffected citizens. If article 51 applied to internal conflicts, the "Chieu
Hoi" program would be illegal."8 The French also infused a great deal
of political indoctrination into the curriculum in the schools which they
established in camps and villages.
Article 78 permits the occupying power to "subject [protected per-
sons] to assigned residence or internment . . . for imperative reasons
of security." The article specifies, however, that protected persons
should have the right to appeal the decision and to periodical review if
the decision is upheld. Few countries have established judicial proce-
dures for the review of relocation decisions.
The Civilian Convention also contains over twenty separate articles
on places of internment and the rights of internees. 9 Many requirements
parallel those found in the POW Convention. Generally, Chapter II
insures that the internee is safely housed, well-fed and otherwise pro-
tected. If Chapter II applied to internal conflicts, few internment camps
would measure up to its standards.
"'See generally article 55, which provides that "the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring
the food and medical supplies of the population... " Id. art. 55, at 3552, 75 U.N.T.S. 322.
"'But see Wosepka, Repatriation and the Chieu Hoi Amnesty Approach in Vietnam: Conse-
quences and Prospects, 5 INT'L LAW. 637 (1971).
"'Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Civilian Persons), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 79-135,
(1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, 3568, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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B. To Defoliate Farm and Forest Lands and Destroy Food Stores
In most third world countries the majority of the population live
outside the cities. Rural and poor, they subsist on the land. The rebels
rely upon the meager peasant food stores of the populace to sustain
themselves. The thick jungle and tropical rain forests which flourish in
many of these lands protect the guerrilla forces by providing shelter,
concealing their movements, and preventing effective pursuit. In Ma-
laya the jungle is so thick, for instance, that a man disappears from view
six feet off the road.90 In Cyprus and in the Philippines the mountain
forests have offered refuge to insurgent forces.91 In such circumstances,
government forces have a clear incentive to cut off rebel food supplies
and destroy their natural cover, as the English did during the Boer war.9"
The Allied program in South Vietnam illustrates such an effort. Both
the initial date of the Allied crop destruction mission and the extent of
the acreage destroyed are disputed. Perhaps as early as 1962, and cer-
tainly no later than the spring of 1965, the Allies had launched a crop
destruction program.93 A New York Times dispatch reported:
Although the Vietcong control or at least contest 70 per cent of the
land area of the nation, crop destruction missions are aimed only at
relatively small areas of major military importance where the guerril-
las grow their own food or where the population is willingly committed
to their cause. 4
A 1967 Japanese study concluded that Allied spraying had ruined more
than 3.8 million acres of arable land.9" The United States dismissed such
claims as propaganda. Nevertheless, it conceded destroying 20,000
acres, or one-third of one percent of the land cultivated. However large
the acreage destroyed, the United States claimed that "great care has
been taken to select areas in which most harm would be done to the Viet
Cong and the least harm to the local population."9
Allied ground forces have also destroyed crops and killed livestock.
The journalistic accounts of the war are replete with examples of such
"See Dougherty, supra note 78, at 302.
"See Gourlay, Terror in Cypress, THE GUERRILLA-AND HOW TO FIGHT HIM 232 (T. Greene ed.
1962); see also Hammer, Huks in the Philippines, MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE 177 (F. Osanka
ed. 1962).
"The tactic is not new to the American army either. Union forces used it during the Civil War.
'IS. HERSH, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 151 (1968).
"N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1965, at 1, col. 5.
'IS. HERSH, supra note 93, at 153.
"Id. at 156.
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destruction. 7 One legal justification offered for the destruction was that
the food was intended for or was being used by the Viet Cong.98 Fre-
quently, however, Allied forces commandeered the rice supplies rather
than destroy them.9"
Though effective defoliation posed greater problems than did crop
destruction, 00 the Allies persisted. They wished to strip off the forest
cover above rebel supply routes and expose concentrations of guerrilla
units.
The Applicable Law
Article 3 does not explicitly forbid crop destruction or defoliation
programs. Unless they produce inhumane side effects upon the pro-
tected population so great as to offset the legitimate military advantage
gained, thereby such programs are legally permissible. In a Japanese
study, critics of United States policies in Vietnam decried the cruel
impact of crop destruction and defoliation programs on what they de-
scribe as the innocent civilian population. The chemicals used in crop
spraying are toxic,'0' and they can and sometimes do adversely affect
men. The same Japanese study charged that the herbicides used in crop
destruction programs have caused over 1000 peasant deaths.' 2 Others
have attributed blindness and premature or stillborn births to exposure
to the chemicals used. 10 3 Realistically, defoliation seldom causes any
such immediate effect because few people other than transient guerrillas
inhabit the forested areas. It may nevertheless cause untoward ecologi-
cal imbalances whose total effect is as yet unrealized. In addition, the
chemicals do affect livestock and other animals.'0
Under the more detailed norms of the law of war applicable to inter-
national conflicts, defoliation and crop destruction would remain legiti-
"
7Cf. J. SCHELL, THE MILITARY HALF (1968).
"An American pilot is quoted as saying, "We bomb the paddies by day to deny food to the VC
. as a matter of fact we destroy pretty much anything that might be useful" quoted in Mirsky,
The Tombs of Ben Suc, CRIMES OF WAR, 363, 367 (R. Falk, G. Kolko & R. Lifton eds. 1971).
"Bertolino, Report on American Conduct of the War in the South, CRIMES OF WAR, 319, 328
(R. Falk, G. Kolko & R. Lifton eds. 1971).
'0S. HERSH, supra note 93, at 153, quotes Secretary McNamara as telling Congress that "defol-
iation is still a rather primitive technique. . . . It depends for its effectiveness on the time of year,
the type of foliage and on wind and other conditions in the area."
'*'The level of toxicity to man is, however, low and the chemical dissolves in the soil quickly. It
can nevertheless cause eye irritation and gastrointestinal upset.
2S. HERSH, supra note 93, at 152.
"1id. at 157.
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mate military tactics. Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations simply
formalizes the "balancing test" outlined above:
. . . [l]t is especially forbidden: . . . (2) 1 to destroy or seize the
enemy's property, unless such destruction be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war.'0 5
As one post-World War II war crimes judge lamented: "The rule is
clear enough but the factual determination as to what constitutes mili-
tary necessity is difficult."'06 Some courts have lent a sympathetic ear
to the plea of military necessity; others, a deaf one." 7 In the Hostages
Trial the court suggested that a retreating army could destroy public
and private property "which would give aid and comfort to the
enemy."' 18 The Allies in Vietnam have denied villages to the Viet Cong
by destroying them. Former Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze's justifi-
cation echoes the Court's judgment: "Where neither the United States
nor Vietnamese forces can maintain continuous occupancy, it is neces-
sary to destroy those facilities."' 9 The tribunal in the High Command
case felt that "a great deal of latitude" should be given the commander
who must decide whether to destroy enemy property. It too emphasized
the importance of the factual determination:
What constitutes devastation beyond military necessity in these situa-
tions requires detailed proof of an operational and tactical nature."'
111. THE CLAIM TO TREAT CAPTURED PERSONNEL AS COMMON
CRIMINALS OR TRAITORS RATHER THAN AS PRISONERS OF WAR
The rebel presently fights in a twilight zone between lawful comba-
tancy and common criminality."' Governments are loathe to recognize
the captured or surrendered rebel as a prisoner of war, particularly in
the insurgent stage of the revolution. The Russian delegate to the 1912
"*'Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23
(g), 36 Stat. 2277, 2302 (1911), T.S. No. 539. Article 46 provides that private property must be
respected, and subsequent articles whose provisions were repeated and expanded in the Civilian
Convention delineate the rights of the Occupying Power vis a vis property owners. These and other
articles dealing with property seem inappropriate in the context of internal conflict.
'"'The German High Command Trial, XII LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 93-
94. (U.N. War Crimes Commission 1947).
"'Courts have been less sympathetic to the plea in nonproperty cases. E.g., The Peleus Trial, I
LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 15-16. (U.N. War Crime Commission 1947).
0'8The Hostages Trial, VIII LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 67-9 (1949).
'"
9N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1965, § I, at 3, col. I.
"'The German High Command Trial, supra note 106, at 123-26.
"'Greenspan, International Law and Its Protection for Participants in Unconventional Warfare,
341 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 30, 32 (1962).
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International Conference of the Red Cross denounced the proposal to
extend convention protections to participants in civil wars:
I consider, in addition, that the Red Cross Societies should have no
duty towards insurgents or bands of revolutionaries whom the laws of
my country regard as criminals."'
The guerrilla himself was initially regarded, even in international
conflicts, as a violator of the law of war;" 3 and though the 1949 Geneva
Conventions granted him legal status in certain limited circumstances,
he remains an outcast.14
Indeed, a country's initial reaction to an insurgency is usually to
decree martial rule, expand the reach of the criminal law, and increase
the punishment for offenses endangering national security." 5 In the Phil-
ippines, for example, the government suspended the right of habeas
corpus for all those detained for the crimes of "sedition, insurrection,
or rebellion" and for "all other crimes . . . committed . . . in further-
ance . . . thereof.""' In Thailand the government conferred upon mili-
tary courts the jurisdiction to try "offenses against the Sovereign...
the security of the state . . . public peace and order.""' These examples
demonstrate that states, far from recognizing rebels as legitimate com-
batants, will first pursue extraordinary criminal remedies against
them."'
The record of state practice also demonstrates, however, that govern-
ments may eventually treat captured persons as prisoners of war. France
finally abandoned its effort to prosecute the Algerian rebels as crimi-
nals. In March 1958, General Salan ordered that military prisoners be
held in special camps rather than in prisons; and the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, which had been permitted to inspect the French
prison and detention camps, "construed these actions to mean that the
French government intended to accord to FLN militants treatment
'closely related' to that governing prisoners of war in international con-
"'Quoted in Schologel, supra note I1, at 125.
"'Baxter, So-called "Unprivileged Belligerency:" Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 334 (1951).
"'Professor Farer refers to the guerrilla as the "stepchild of the laws of war" and characterizes
him as "grudgingly recognized and poorly treated." T. FARER, supra note 8 at 36.





"'For an analysis of a specific case see Dugard, South West Africa and the "Terrorist Trial,"
64 A.J.I.L. 19 (1970).
[Vol. 3: 345
LAW FOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS
flicts." ll9 The Algerian rebels had said from the beginning that they
treated captured French soldiers as prisoners of war. 120 Though both
factions in the Congo mistreated captured personnel; one student never-
theless concluded:
Most captives in the Congo civil war were detained under acceptable
conditions and exchanged or released in the course of hostilities. The
International Committee of the Red Cross visited prisons representing
all factions during the crisis in an effort to insure that prisoners re-
ceived treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention.,
The Applicable Law
This confusing pattern of state practice reflects the confused state of
present law. Article 3 does not confer prisoner of war status upon any-
one although it does charge the captor with the duty to treat a prisoner
humanely. Even if the prisoner of war convention itself were applicable,
many combatants in internal conflicts would not qualify as prisoners of
war. Basically, article 4 of the POW Convention says that one is a
prisoner of war if, one, he is a member of a national armed force or,
two, if he is a member of a group that fulfills the following four condi-
tions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
No guerrilla is likely to qualify for POW status under such conditions.
While the guerrilla force will probably have a hierarchical command,
its members are not likely to wear a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance"; nor will they always bear arms openly.'22 Whether or not
they obey the laws of war seems an irrelevant criterion. Desirable as it
might be for all parties to a conflict to obey the laws and customs of
war 23 one's failure to do so should not affect his status or even his
"'Fraleigh, The Algerian Revolution As a Case Study in International Law, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 179, 196 (R. Falk ed. 1971).
'"'Jabhat al-Tahrir aI-Qwami, WHITE PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVEN-
TIONS OF 1949 TO THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN CONFLICT 15-18 (1960).
'McNemar, The Post-Independence War in the Congo, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL
WAR 244, 264 (R. Falk ed. 1971).
'"See Kelly, supra note 14, at 99.
"See note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80
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subsequent treatment, other than the severity of punishment upon prose-
cution. In our criminal law the man charged with the most reprehensible
crime is still submitted to the reasoned judgment of the law. The absurd-
ity of the last of the four conditions is not the point, however; it is that
many participants in an internal war would not be entitled to prisoner
of war status even if international law standards were applicable.
On the other hand, there is, as Professor Baxter has pointed out, a
trend toward extending "the protection of prisoner-of-war status to an
ever-increasing group. ... "I Free World Forces in Vietnam, for ex-
ample, treat as prisoners of war large numbers who do not satisfy the
article 4 criteria. Moreover, the General Assembly has repeatedly called
upon governments to treat captured insurgents as prisoners of war; 25
and the International Committee of the Red Cross has intervened with
varying degrees of success in numerous internal conflicts to insure hu-
mane treatment of prisoners. 26
The answer may well be that a combatant in an internal conflict
cannot be classified by using existing legal forms. Rather than trying
to determine whether he is or is not a prisoner of war with all the legal
consequences such a status entails, one might more fruitfully reflect
upon whether different kinds of participants in internal conflicts should
be entitled to different rights. Such a classification scheme would reflect
the functional necessity and wisdom of treating one kind of participant
differently from another. Within certain categories one might then look
to certain provisions in the Geneva Conventions for authoritative stan-
dards of humane treatment. Treating a rebel as a prisoner of war for
one purpose would not require the same treatment for all purposes.
Some provisions of the POW Convention might prove unworkable in
the peculiar context of internal war. It is far more difficult, for example,
to determine "the combat zone" in a guerrilla conflict than in a World
War lI-type war. Other provisions may be incompatible with specific
article 3 provisions. There is, for instance, the clause in article 3 which
HARV. L. REV. 851 (1967), which explores the theoretical difficulty of making international law
binding on guerrillas and other insurgent groups. See also External Affairs, [1965] INT'L REV. RED
CROss 636. Among recent rebel groups only the Algerians claimed to follow the law of war. The
Viet Cong, for example, rejected the idea that it was bound "by the international treaties to which
others besides itself subscribed."
'
2 Baxter, supra note 113, at 343.
"'E.g., G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969); G.A. Res.
.2395, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969); G.A. Res. 2446,23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 18, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
'
2
'Veuthey, The Red Cross and Non-InternationalConflicts, [1970] INT'L REV. OF THE RED
CROSs 411, 416.
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seemingly permits prosecution and execution of rebels but not prisoners
of war.
A. To try and to execute summarily
The news photo flashed around the world during the 1968 Tet offen-
sive in Vietnam showing the Saigon chief of police executing a suspected
Viet Cong with his hand gun dramatically demonstrated the reality of
the frequently asserted claim to execute captured foes summarily. Jour-
nalists reported that some commanders in the Nigerian army similarly
disposed of captured Ibo tribesmen fighting for Biafra. Both sides in the
Congolese war occasionally indulged their taste for summary justice.
Following an attack upon a United Nations mess at Kindu, Congolese
soldiers arrested thirteen Italian airmen, shot them, dismembered their
bodies, and passed the pieces out to onlookers.'27 A year before, a
Liberian contingent had herded ninety-two arrested Baluba tribesmen
into unventilated railroad cars. They suffocated.'28
Guerrilla forces often dispense summary justice because they control
no territory and lack the facilities in which to house prisoners. One
should hardly expect a small mobile unit to drag handcuffed prisoners
through the jungle with them on their way to the next ambush, therefore,
the policy of taking no prisoners is a reasonable one. Unfortunately, it
is often translated into a policy of executing all captured personnel.
However, the practice of the Castro forces demonstrated that "taking
no prisoners" need not be a euphemism for murder. A journalist who
trudged through the mountains with Castro quotes Castro's brother
Raoul talking to captured Batista soldiers:
We hope that you will stay with us and fight against the master who
so ill-used you. If you decide to refuse this invitation-and I am not
going to repeat it-you will be delivered to the custody of the Cuban
Red Cross tomorrow. Once you are under Batista's orders again, we
hope that you will not take up arms against us. But, if you do, remem-
ber this:
We took you this time. We can take you again. And when we do
we will not frighten or torture or kill you, any more than we are doing
to you at this moment. If you are captured a second time or even a
third by us, we will again return you exactly as we are doing now." 9
"'McNemar, supra note 121, at 264.
"lid. at 265.
' Chapelle, supra n.22, at 223.
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The Applicable Law
In fact, there are really two separate claims being made here: the first,
to forego any trial at all; the second, to execute. As to the first, there
can be little doubt that international law requires trial before the imposi-
tion of punishment, whether capital or otherwise. Article 3 forbids:
• . . the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions with-
out previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispen-
sable by civilized peoples.3 0
This simple prohibition reflects a principle of criminal justice common
to all domestic legal systems: every man is entitled to his day in court.
The specific application of that principle as dictated by the language of
article 3 is not so simple. What is a "regularly constituted court"? What
"judicial guarantees" are recognized as "indispensable by all civilized
peoples"?
The "regularly constituted court" requirement should not be con-
strued too literally. Guerrillas, after all, are not apt to carry black robes
and white wigs in their back packs. Any proceeding they convoke will
necessarily be ad hoc. While the government will have a system of
established courts, they may not be open for business-at least not for
the business of trying rebels. Operating under martial rule, the govern-
ment may have created special courts or conferred jurisdiction on mili-
tary tribunals. Precedent justifies characterizing such tribunals as "reg-
ularly constituted courts."'' The test is authoritativeness; that is,
whether the appropriate authorities, acting under appropriate powers,
created the court according to appropriate standards.
There is today a consensus that certain specific rights are fundamen-
tal to trial in any such court. Among these are prompt notice of charges,
adequate time and facilities to prepare defense, right to counsel and the
assistance of an interpreter. This list of rights appears in such diverse
agreements as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 32 the POW
Convention,' 3  the Civilian Convention, 34 the European Convention
'3Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces in the Field) Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, 3118, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 34.
1
3 J. KELLY and G. PELLETIER, supra note 115, at 303-305.
132North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII-9, [195312 U.S.T. 1792, 1802,
T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, 80 (effective Aug. 23, 1953).
'1Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Prisoners of War), Aug. 12, 1949,
arts. 84, 99, 103-06, [19551 3 U.S.T. 3316, 3382, 3392, 3394-98, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
135, 200, 210, 212-16.
13'Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Civilian Persons) Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
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For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,135
and the draft American Convention on Human Rights.3 ' The right to
a speedy trial and the right to appeal are also important though less
universally conceded rights. The "judicial guarantees . . . recognized as
indispensable by all civilized peoples" do not include a jury or a ban on
hearsay evidence. There are almost no rules of evidence in civil law
countries, 137 and likewise no requirement of jury trials in some criminal
cases. 38 However, there are minimum standards, but it is difficult to
imagine guerrilla forces being able to comply with even the most mini-
mal standards. There is also substantial precedent for the proposition
that the government may suspend at least some among them during
public emergencies.39
Other than the implied sanction of executions, article 3 is silent as to
the scope of permissible punishments, only conditioning their imposition
upon a prior judicial determination of guilt. States have repeatedly used
such punishments as the firing squad, the rope, or the gas chamber to
silence once and for all those who opposed them. Those who oppose
capital punishment concede that "there is nothing [in article 3] to pre-
vent the execution of such combatants merely for having borne arms
against the enemy."' 4 Since "the slaughter of prisoners with or without
legal proceedings can hardly satisfy humanitarian conscience," they
argue for either (1) deferment or (2) annulment of capital punishment
during hostilities. Mr. Veuthey argues:' 4'
68-75, 123, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, 3560-66, 3600, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 330-34,
370.
"European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 219, 228.
" American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, in O.A.S., Handbook of Existing Rules
Pertaining to Human Rights 53, OEA/Ser. h/v/l. 23, Doc. 21 (Eng.) Rev. (Dec. 17, 1970).
'J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 125 (1969).
1old. at 139. Professor Merryman does argue that the equivalent of a jury exists, but he admits
that it "may not consist of twelve persons, it may frequently take the form of lay advisors who sit
on the bench with the judge, and even where it looks like ours, it may not have to render a
unanimous verdict of guilty in order for the accused to be convicted." At some point differences
of degree become differences of kind, and the Professor's conclusion from the preceding recital is
an understatement: "These are, particularly when they accumulate, important differences between
our conception of a jury and theirs."
"'Article 15 of the European Convention, for example, explicitly states: "In time of war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention .. " The European Court of Human
Rights has upheld detention without trial under the article 15 exception by the Republic of Ireland
in its suppression of the outlawed Irish Republic Army. "Lawless" Case, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONV.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438, 474.
'
0Veuthey, supra note 126 at 416.
"'Id. at 417.
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• . .Any capital punishment in time of conflict, in relation with the
conflict, cannot fail to bring about an increase in tension, vigorous
reaction from the enemy and even reprisals.
The problem of capital punishment is but one aspect of the problem.
The black militant demand in this country to be treated as a prisoner
of war illustrates the complexity of the issue. If we accept the proposi-
tion that he may not be punished for "offing a pig" the converse is also
true that he may be held for the duration of the conflict. The indetermi-
nate sentence is widely used; if it were not, a rebel tried in a civil court
would be released and returned to the streets or jungles to continue the
revolution, a prospect which can hardly delight authorities.'42 Attempts
to "reeducate" confined rebels or loyalists may also violate their rights
if they are analogized to prisoners of war. Participation in a "Chieu
Hoi" program arguably constitutes a renunciation of rights not permit-
ted by the Geneva Convention. With the exception of article 5 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits "cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment," suffice it to say that pres-
ent international law provides almost no guidelines as to the permissible
kind and form of punishment.
B. To Detain Arbitrarily
The problem of detention is multifaceted, because the claim to detain
arbitrarily is but a general one embracing many specific, related claims.
There are, for example, claims to detain prisoners incognito without
charges; claims to hold in solitary confinement; claims to bar visits by
relatives, friends, ministers, or representatives of relief organizatons;
and claims to deny, regulate, or censor correspondence. Beyond these
claims there is the problem of housing and feeding those detained. While
no government explicitly claims the right to hold persons in unsanitary
camps and feed them a subsistence diet, governments do hold people in
just such conditions daily.
A few examples will put flesh on this skeletal outline of claims. In
1955 the Singapore Legislative Assembly passed legislation permitting
authorities to detain persons for as long as two years on the mere
suspicion that the detainee might commit an act "prejudicial to the
security of Malaya."' 43 The act also authorized the imposition of house
"
2Consequently, the South Vietnamese review all defendants immediately prior to their release
and may extend their confinement. T. Mien, Vietnam: National Security Needs in a Constitutional
Government 16, Feb. 5, 1971 (unpublished thesis in the Judge Advocate General's School).
"'See Hickling, The First Five Years of the Federation of Malaya Constitution, 4 MALAYA L.
REV. 183, 184-85 (1962). Several hundred persons were detained under this act. See also Davies,
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arrest, police supervision, and curfews on suspected individuals. Both
government and rebel groups have refused inspections by agencies such
as the International Committee of the Red Cross even though its reports
are never made public. North Vietnam did not permit any Red Cross
visit to their prisoner of war camps. The Red Cross never inspected rebel
prison facilities in Algeria.'44 South Vietnamese citizens have demon-
strated against their government's refusal to permit visits to friends and
relatives incarcerated in Vietnamese jails.'45 The press descriptions of
the so-called "tiger cages" revealed shocking conditions in what had
been trumpeted as model facilities.'46
The problem is partially one of resources and priorities. One can
hardly expect a small, underdeveloped country whose government is
fighting for its existence to devote substantial quantities of its precious
resources to the building and maintaining of model penal colonies. One
can expect even less of the guerrillas. But the problem is exacerbated
by the lack of authoritative international law standards for detention
applicable to internal conflicts. In their absence, it is not surprising that
conditions are as despicable as they are.
The Applicable Law
Article 3, whose protective ambit embraces all those detained for any
reason, imposes only the general requirement of humane treatment,
which is amplified by prohibitions on "cruel treatment and torture" and
"outrages upon personal dignity, and in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment." These general standards do not constitute a set
of specific rules and regulations for detention. They do provide guidance
for the establishment of such rules, particularly if interpreted in the light
of the detailed provisions of the prisoner of war and civilian conventions,
which are, after all, designed to implement the same standards.
The POW Convention sets out very specific rules for detention.
Medical care: Prisoners of war "may be interned only in premises lo-
cated on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthful-
ness."' 47 They are entitled to free medical care as needed'48 and should
be medically examined monthly. '
Prevention of Crime Ordinance, 1959, 1 MALAYA L. REV. 163 (1959), in which the act is analyzed.
"'Fraleigh, supra note 119, at 196.4
sNew York Times, Jan. I, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
"'Cf. New York Times, July 14, 1970, cot. 3 at p. 1.
" 
7Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Prisoners of War), Aug. 12, 1949, art.
22, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, 3336, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 154.
"lid. at 15, at 3330, 75 U.N.T.S. 148.
"'Id. art. 31, at 3342, 75 U.N.T.S. 160.
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Housing: Generally, prisoners cannot be held in "close confine-
ment." '5 0 They must be housed in barracks "protected from dampness
and adequately heated and lighted" and allotted at least the minimum
"surface and . . . cubic space . . . , bedding and blankets" given
"forces of the detaining power who are billeted in the same area."'' The
detaining authorities are obligated "to take all sanitary measures neces-
sary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent
epidemics."'' 2
Food: Prisoners are entitled to "daily food rations . . . sufficient in
quantity, quality, and variety to . . . prevent loss of weight or the
development of nutritional deficiencies."'5 3
Communication privilege: Within a week of capture, the prisoner is
entitled to write his family,'54 and he may continue writing no less than
two letters and four cards monthly. 5 Moreover, "prisoners of war shall
be allowed to receive by post or by any other means individual parcels
or collective shipments containing, in particular, foodstuffs, clothing,
medical supplies and articles of a religious, educational or recreational
ch aracter . . . . ,,,56
It is unrealistic to expect that participants in internal conflicts will
build and maintain such model detention facilities, desirable as that
might be. There is nevertheless one recurrent standard in these provi-
sions not found in article 3, and adherence to it might insure more
humane detention conditions than now generally prevail. The standard
is that prisoners are entitled to the same general treatment accorded
members of the captor's armed forces or his nationals, as, for example,
in article 49 which specifies that those prisoners who are required or who
elect 57 to work are entitled "to suitable working conditions not inferior
to those enjoyed by nationals of the Detaining Power employed in simi-
lar work, especially as regards accommodations, food, clothing, and
equipment."'58 Given the often disparate conditions in which guerrillas
operate and the poverty which afflicts most third world countries, the
similar treatment standard will not insure anything like ideal treatment.
"lid. art. 21, at 3334, 75 U.N.T.S. 152.
" id. art. 25, at 3338, 75 U.N.T.S. 156.
"lid. art. 29, at 3342, 75 U.N.T.S. 160.
"id. art. 26, at 3340, 75 U.N.T.S. 158.
"l4 d. art. 70, at 3370, 75 U.N.T.S. 188.
'lid. art. 71.
ld. art. 72, at 3372, 75 U.N.T.S. 190. But see id. art. 76, at 3376, 75 U.N.T.S. 194.
"l71d. art. 49, at 3354, 75 U.N.T.S. 172. Officers cannot be required to work though they may
volunteer. Non-commissioned officers can only be given supervisory jobs.
" Id. art. 51, at 3356, 75 U.N.T.S. 174.
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The ideal is seldom a viable alternative, however, and so long as the
participants feed, house, and care for their prisoners no less well than
they do for their own forces, they may have conceded as much to the
demands of humanity as the necessity of their circumstances permits.
C. To Use Coercive Means of Interrogation
Intelligence information is vital to both sides in an internal conflict.
Its importance to the guerrilla is obvious, since he must know when to
strike and when to flee. It is even more important to the government,
however, because it must pierce the veil of secrecy behind which the
rebel conceals his operations. A military correspondent for Le Monde
said of the need for intelligence in Algeria: "The search for information,
once the concern of general staffs, has become for everybody a question
of life or death."'59 Consequently, both sides may claim the right to use
coercive methods of interrogation to obtain intelligence data. Laotian
Major Generals Vang Pao and Kouprasith Abkay recently conceded to
newsmen "that prisoners who had refused to cooperate in interrogations
. . . were subjected to deprivation of food and drink, to beatings and
electrical shock torture."' 60 Of one man, starved for four days despite a
shoulder wound, beaten and tortured by shocks administered through
electrodes fixed to two fingers of his left hand, General Vang Pao
shrugged: "He does not want to tell the truth, so he was forced a little."
Such callous observation proves Professor Farer's assertion that
"[s]ince in guerrilla war the most serious problem facing incumbents is
a lack of intelligence, the military, if not the political, leaders may
regard any inhibitions on intelligence gathering techniques with surly
apprehension."''
The Applicable Law
Article 3 does not forbid interrogation, but it does prohibit "torture."
There may well be a distinction between "coercion" and "torture", but
while the former is not specifically forbidden, its use may be circum-
scribed by the prohibitions on inhumane, humiliating, or degrading
treatment. It should also be clear that most of the standard techniques
such as applying electrical shocks, driving splinters under fingernails,
and dunking in water constitute torture rather than coercion under any
reasonable definition of those terms.
"'Quoted in J. KRAFT, supra note 24, at 102.
'"New York Times, Oct. 20, 1970, at 27, col. 3.
"'Farer, supra note 8, at 64.
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Were the entire POW Convention applicable, authorities could still
interrogate prisoners. Article 17 does not bar all questioning. It does,
however, forbid "any physical or mental torture," as well as "any form
of coercion." While requiring prisoners to give their "surnames, first
names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial
number," it specifies that "prisoners of war who refuse to answer may
not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvanta-
geous treatment of any kind." Again, terms such as "disadvantageous
treatment" are not self-defining, but article 17 would appear to preclude
the common practice of denying food and medical attention to captured
persons until they "talk." This view is reinforced by the frequent charge
to treat the sick and wounded "without any adverse distinction founded
on sex, race, nationality, religion, political, or other similar criteria."'' 2
Refusal to answer questions should not preclude care, since "only urgent
medical reasons" determine priority of treatment. 6 3 Other Convention
articles point to the same conclusion. Captors must evacuate the pris-
oner from "the combat zone" as quickly as possible.'64 One could imply
that beyond ascertaining identity, any questioning must be delayed until
the prisoner is interned in "camps situated in an area far enough from
the combat zone to be out of danger."' 65 The implication is practically
sound because most violations occur within a very short time after
capture when line personnel interrogate for "combat" intelligence. The
line officer, untrained in the art of questioning and lacking the time to
"soften" the prisoner, too often resorts to intimidation or torture.'66
The prohibition on coercion does not tie the hands of the skilled
interrogator. He can exploit the understandable fears of the prisoner
"12E.g., Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces in the Field), Aug.
12, 1949, art. 12, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, 3122, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 38; Geneva
Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces at Sea), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12,
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, 3226, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 92; Geneva Convention for the
Protection of War Victims (Prisoners of War), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 16, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, 3330,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 148. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims
(Civilian Persons), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, 3526, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 296.
"'Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces in the Field), Aug. 12,
1949, art. 12, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, 3122, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 38; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forceas at Sea), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12, [1955] 3
U.S.T. 3217, 3226, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 92.
'"Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Prisoners of War), Aug. 12, 1949, art.
19, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, 3334, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 152.
165Id.
"Moreover, the officer is probably unfamiliar with the native language. The U.S. Army trains
its soldiers to segregate prisoners and send them to the rear immediately so that trained interroga-
tors can question them.
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through a variety of standard psychological techniques of interrogation.
As one scholar has put it:'67 "Article 17 . . . does not protect the pris-
oner against the wiles and cunning of enemy interrogators." There are
no international Miranda rules, and the captor has no duty under the
convention to reassure, calm, or put the enemy prisoner at ease.
IV. THE CLAIM TO BAR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
Humanitarian relief efforts are not new. During the 18th century wars
between France and England, Samuel Johnson organized a committee
in London to supply clothing to French prisoners of war held in Eng-
land. What is new is the capacity of the international community to
mobilize large scale, sustained relief efforts. The United Nations and the
International Committee of the Red Cross maintain trained staffs and
can tap substantial resources. The Red Cross, particularly, can draw
upon its considerable experience in organizing and carrying out relief
efforts."8 A host of other private organizations such as church groups
also run humanitarian relief programs and often participate in joint
efforts. '69
Unfortunately, governments sometimes decline offers of humanitar-
ian relief or diminish its impact by interfering with shipments. The
attitude of the Nigerian government during the recent civil war in that
country is a case in point. They declared the first executive of the relief
effort "persona non grata" after ten months because they felt he favored
the Biafrans.'70 They authorized only perilous nighttime flights to rebel
held territory.' They insisted that flights to Biafra land at the Uli
airfield, which Biafra used for military purposes. Biafran authorities
refused to permit the neutralization of the base. 7' When Biafrans and
federal authorities finally agreed upon a neutral base, Nigerian pilots
strafed it.'73 An ICRC DC-7B flying to Biafra was shot down on 5 June
1969, and the ICRC felt obliged to suspend further relief flights for
several weeks.' The Nigerian government insisted on inspecting ship-
'
7 Glod and Smith, Interrogation Under the 1949 Prisoners of War Convention, 21 MIL. L. REV.
148 (1963).
8E.g.. Relief in 1967, [1968] INT'L. REV. OF THE RED CRoss 407-15.
"'Freymond, Aid to the Victims of the Civil War in Nigeria, [1970] INT'L. REV. OF THE RED
CROss 65, 76-77.
'
7 Help to War Victims in Nigeria, [1969] INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 353, 356.
"'Id. at 355. The Nigerian air force had no night fighters but did use anti-aircraft guns. As guns
were flown into Biafra under cover of darkness, government forces were apt to shoot at anything
in the air.
"'Help to War Victims in Nigeria, [19681 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROss 516, 517.
'"Id. at 455, 461.
"'Help to War Victims in Nigeria, supra note 170 at 353.
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ments,75 and it would not permit the ICRC to send food through a land
corridor, the method which the head of the relief operation in Biafra
insisted was necessary if adequate foodstuffs were to be supplied. 7"
Countries other than the Nigerian Federal Government blocked relief
efforts. On several occasions the government of Equatorial Guinea,
from whose Santa Isabel base the ICRC flew its relief planes to Biafra,
jeopardized the airlift. It forbade transportation of fuel which the ICRC
used to generate electricity in its hospitals and to run the trucks deliver-
ing food and medicine.'77 It once forbade any flights at all for two
weeks.'78
The attitude of the federal government was understandable if not
commendable. In the first place, it was legitimately concerned that rebel
supporters might conceal military supplies in the relief shipments. Sec-
ondly, it feared that the relief supplies would strengthen the rebels and
thereby prolong their resistance. In an internal conflict it is difficult to
ascertain whether one is feeding an innocent civilian or a soldier. A
wounded soldier whom an ICRC medical team heals may return to the
battlefront. For all these difficulties, starvation cannot be recognized as
a legitimate means of waging war even though the Tribunal in the High
Command Case held: 179
A belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege a place controlled by
the enemy and endeavour by a process of isolation to cause its surren-
der. The propriety of attempting to reduce it by starvation is not
questioned. Hence the cutting off of every source of sustenance from
without is deemed legitimate. It is said that if the commander of a
besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number
of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an
extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten the surrender.
The Applicable Law
Article 3 does not oblige the warring factions in an internal conflict
to accept or permit humanitarian relief. It does, however, permit "[an
impartial body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
[to] offer its services to the Parties to the conflict." The draftsmen of
article 3 undoubtedly assumed that a party which accepted such an offer
'
7 Freymond, supra note 169, at 67.
""Help to War Victims in Nigeria, supra note 172, at 518.
'Help to War Victims in Nigeria, [1969] INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 81, 84.
7
'Id. at 86.
"'The German HighCommand Trial, supra note 106, at 84. See also Mayer, Starvation as a
Wrapon, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 76 (S. Rose ed. 1968).
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would respect the Red Cross symbol and its personnel even though
article 3 does not specifically require such respect. Yet some states have
agreed to Red Cross efforts at the organization's own peril. Red Cross
hospitals have been attacked and doctors slain. Consequently, national
societies have often hesitated to act. 180
Even under the broader rules of the Geneva Conventions, states have
not obligated themselves to accept offers of humanitarian assistance.
Several Convention provisions nevertheless subsume the compatibility
of private relief efforts with Convention obligations. Common article 9
of the Geneva Conventions, for example, states:
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red
Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject
to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for
the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.'
This provision expands article 88 of the 1929 Geneva Conventions,
which limited the right of humanitarian initiative to the International
Red Cross. The Hague Regulations of 1907 also permitted approved
relief agencies to carry out their charitable activities, and the ICRC
during World War I opened a Prisoners of War Agency and sent dele-
gates to inspect internment camps. 8' The right of humanitarian initia-
tive is thus a well established principle, codified in prior international
agreements.
The rules governing the kind of relief a charitable group may offer,
the persons whom it may aid, and the procedures by which it dispenses
assistance are less clear. Since the present Conventions mention the Red
Cross in connection with a number of specific humanitarian responsibil-
ities, 8 ' any initiative in one of those areas would be legitimate. Beyond
that, Pictet categories authorized activities into three kinds: (1) repre-
sentations, interventions, suggestions, and practical measures affecting
the protection accorded under the Convention; (2) the sending of medi-
cal and other personnel and equipment; and (3)the sending and distribu-
tion of relief (foodstuffs, clothing, and medicaments)." 4 The only test is
whether the activity is "purely humanitarian in character."' 18 5 The con-
"Veuthey, supra note 126, at 416.
"Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces in the Field),Aug. 12,
1949, art. 9, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, 3120, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 37.
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cept of appropriate relief has gone far beyond article 24 of the 1909
London Declaration, which declared that food, clothing, clothing mate-
rial and footwear suitable for military use were conditional rather than
absolute contraband. Unfortunately, one man's humanitarianism may
be another's political manuevering, and even the ICRC has been ac-
cused of favoritism.
Pictet implies that eligible recipients include all those to whom the
Conventions are applicable. That criterion, broad as it is, may still be
too narrow. There are unfortunate gaps in Convention coverage, 86 and
the range of conflicts to which it is applicable is uncertain. The Civilian
Convention, for example, often refers only to children, expectant moth-
ers, and the wounded and sick. They are not likely to constitute the bulk
of any civilian population. Scholars who support the right of humanitar-
ian intervention have built into the norm a shock-the-conscience test:
intervention is justified only when the target state violates some mini-
mum international law standard. 7 It would seem that any group whose
human rights are endangered is a legitimate object of humanitarian
concern.
Disputes over the appropriate nature of relief and the eligibility of
recipients have not usually proved insurmountable as have, too often,
questions about procedures for supplying the aid. Time and again the
ICRC effort to help war victims in Nigeria collapsed because the parties
quibbled over where, when, and how goods were to be shipped. The
frustrating fact is that states may take away with the left hand what they
give with the right by permitting humanitarian relief in principle but
insisting upon procedures which negate its impact.
Just as in an international conflict a state may blockade its enemy,
in an internal conflict a state retains its right to inspect shipments,
regulate commerce, or close its ports. It, too, may blockade rebel-held
territory, as the Union did during the American Civil War. Interna-
tional law does not permit a state to cut off all shipments to the block-
aded country, however. Article 23 of the Civilian Convention guarantees
free passage for humanitarian shipments.8 8 However, the right of free
'See Bond, Protection of Non-Combatants in Guerrilla Wars, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787
(1971).
1
'One of the most recent examples of humanitarian intervention was the joint Belgian-American
airlift in the Congo, where the rebels held two thousand European hostages.
'"Article 23 states:
Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of
medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only
for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall
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passage is couched in very restrictive language. First, the article limits
the kind of relief which may be shipped. Only "medical and hospital
stores," "objects necessary for religious worship," and "essential food-
stuffs, clothing, and tonics" are entitled to free passage. Second, the
article limits the persons entitled to relief to civilians, children under
fifteen and expectant mothers. This limitation cannot be read to exclude
the sick and wounded, since article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the
Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces at Sea) authorizes free pas-
sage for such consignments. I"9 Third, the article conditions free passage
of relief to such limited categories of persons on several factors, the chief
being that no "definite advantage" will "accrue to the military efforts
or economy of the enemy" upon receipt of the goods. Pictet urges a
reasonable interpretation of the "definite advantage" condition:
It will be agreed, generally speaking, that the contribution represented
by authorized consignments should be limited: in the majority of cases,
such consignments will be hardly sufficient to meet the most urgent
needs and relieve the most pitiable distress; it is hardly likely, there-
fore, that they would represent assistance on such a scale that the
military and economic position of a country was improved to any
appreciable extent. 9
The article also gives the blockading power the right to supervise
likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and
tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.
The obligation of a high Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the consign-
ments indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is
satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:
(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,
(b) that the control may not be effective, or
(d) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy
of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments
for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or
through the release of such material, services or facilities for the production
of such goods.
The Power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated in the first para-
graph of this Article may make such permission conditional on the distribution to the
persons benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of the Protecting
Powers.
Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible, and the Power which
permits their free passage shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements
under which such passage is allowed.
Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Civilian Persons) Aug. 12, 1949, art. 23,
[19551 3 U.S.T. 3516, 3532, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 302.
"'Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims (Armed Forces at Sea), Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 38, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, , T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,
"IV COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 180 (J. Pictet ed. 1958).
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shipments: "the power which permits their free passage shall have the
right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which passage is
allowed." How else could the blockading power quiet its fears "that the
consignments [might] not be effective." The blockading power may, of
course, rely upon a distinterested organization such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross to supervise distribution. Still, it will wish
to set the times, places, and means of delivery. These arrangements,
which are necessary to insure the safety of the personnel distributing the
goods, as well as to protect the interests of the blockading power, should
not negate the impelling requirement that "[sluch consignments shall be
forwarded as rapidly as possible."
V. , CONCLUSION
The law of war is but another proof that Holmes' famous aphorism
about the common law is true of all law: its life force has been experi-
ence, not logic. While some have never been able to rationalize the
coexistence of law with violence, men in every generation have labored
with increasing success to circumscribe the ravages of war by subjecting
its conduct to legal rules. Today we face the familiar challenge: to tailor
the existing law to the peculiar kinds of war characteristic of our
time-namely, internal conflicts waged with guerrilla tactics.
The preceding discussion of competing claims to apply or not apply
the law of war to internal conflict illustrates the complexity of that task.
Reasonable men may debate the wisdom of specific solutions, but they
cannot question the importance of the search.
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